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Floodplain restoration projects are part of sustainable flood management model. However, in practice, they are 
rarely implemented. We analyze the failure of a floodplain restoration project that was supposed to be 
implemented on the River Rhône (France). Based on the analysis of floodplain restoration projects 
implementation literature, we identified several constraints on the implementation of the project. In accordance 
with the literature, institutional factors were found to have played a critical role in the failure of the project. 
Other factors such as opposing representations between inhabitants and river managers were also important. 
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Introduction 
In accordance with current concerns about climate change, European States are reorganizing their flood 
management policies to incorporate practices that are consistent with sustainable development (Guerrin 2012). 
At regional and international levels, institutions such as the European Commission (Erdlenbruch et al. 2009), the 
OECD (2010), the United Nations or the WWF (2004) promote the concept of sustainable flood management 
(Guerrin and Bouleau 2014). In several countries including France (Erdlenbruch et al. 2009), the UK (Werritty 
2006; Gardiner 1992), and the Netherlands (Roth and Warner 2009; Warner and van Buuren 2011; Warner et al. 
2013; Wiering and Immink 2006), current norms on flood management policies focus on the importance of 
managing floods rather than defending against them. Public policies focusing on promoting environmentally 
sound and integrated measures for managing floods combine the possibility of human activity and risk 
occurrence (Moss and Monstadt 2008). They promote measures that enable populations to live with floods 
instead of tackling flood risk by heightening dikes. Floodplain restoration projects form part of this approach 
(Ververk and van Buuren 2013).  
When accompanied by the construction of dikes, the development of floodplains for agricultural or housing 
purposes had hydrological effects (Pigeon 2012; Maltby and Blackwell 2005). Water storage areas used in the 
case of floods became reduced, accelerating water runoff, and increasing the risk of dike failure (Moss and 
Monstadt 2008). Floodplain restoration projects have been designed across Europe, especially since the 1990s, 
with the aim of tackling this issue. Floodplain restoration projects in general refer to “the creation of ecosystems 
typical of floodplains on low-lying land which exhibit a hydrological link between river and land” (Moss and 
Monstadt 2008). In practice, floodplain restoration projects consist of facilitating the return of water (in the case 
of floods) to an area that was flood prone in the past. However, two kinds of floodplain restoration project can be 
distinguished: i) projects whose primary aim is to recreate or enhance the ecological functions of the floodplain. 
These kinds of project are labeled ‘environmental restoration’ or ‘ecological restoration’; and ii) projects whose 
primary aim is to store water by causing the flood to flow to a protected plain, e.g. by reducing existing flood 
protection infrastructures, such as the dikes located upstream, to allow the expansion and storage of water in the 
case of flooding. These kinds of project used to be labeled ‘calamity polders’ and ‘emergency storage areas’ in 
the Netherlands (Roth and Warner 2008) or ‘washlands’ in the UK (Morris 2005). In our case study, we focus on 
the challenges involved in a project that consisted of restoring a floodplain for hydraulic purposes, called in 
French ‘restauration de zone d’expansion de crues’ (or ZEC). 
The principle behind restoring a floodplain for hydraulic purposes is the idea of transferring flood flows from 
areas considered to be “highly vulnerable” (such as urban areas) to areas that are considered to be “less 
vulnerable” (as they are natural land and farmland) (Erdlenbruch et al. 2009). Indeed, this transfer of risk may 
enable highly vulnerable areas to benefit from protection when natural or agricultural land is used for water 
storage (usually located upstream from a vulnerable area in order to reduce the water flow). In France, the State 
is currently reviewing existing flood risk policies on the River Rhône. This is being achieved through a series of 
projects including one that aimed to lower existing dikes to guarantee more protection for towns located 
downstream. However, even if floodplain restoration measures are promoted in flood risk literature, in practice 
they are rarely implemented (Moss and Monstadt 2008).  
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In this paper, we intend to contribute to understand this low implementation. We examine the challenges to the 
implementation of a particular floodplain restoration project on the River Rhône. After seven years of 
negotiations and conflicts between state engineers and riverbank inhabitants, the implementation of the project 
was abandoned. The aim of this paper is to understand the reasons for this failure. Beyond denouncing the low 
social acceptance of a challenging environmental policy, we seek deeper causes of failure, which are structural 
as well as situational, and therefore comparable with failures of other projects in Europe.  
This article builds on an in-depth study of flood strategy on the River Rhône that has been implemented since 
major floods occurred in 2002 and 2003. We analyzed the creation of an institution (“Plan Rhône”) that 
provided a new model for flood risk governance at the level of the river. In particular, we focused our analysis 
on a project designed by the Plan Rhône partners to restore a floodplain in the Lower Rhône river basin. We 
analyzed both the local and national controversies surrounding this project involving inhabitants, elected 
representatives, the public administration and scientists. In this research context, we collected empirical data 
from several sources. We conducted 62 semi-structured interviews between 2010 and 2012 with different kinds 
of actor: Plan Rhône participants, central and local State officials and elected representatives, opponents of the 
floodplain restoration project (inhabitants, associations, local authorities). We reviewed the gray literature 
produced by Plan Rhône (experts’ reports, information provided to the public) and other institutions on floods in 
general and on the River Rhône in particular. We consulted the scientific literature and experts’ reports on 
floods. We analyzed letters exchanged between Plan Rhône and public officials and local governments about the 
floodplain restoration project. We consulted archives on the history of the Lower Rhône and the construction of 
its infrastructure as well as French historical literature on flood management of the River Rhône. We then 
conducted a qualitative analysis of this empirical material to propose an interpretation of the failure of the 
floodplain restoration project.  
The paper is organized as follows: In the first section, we review the literature on floodplain restoration policy 
and the potential driving forces behind, and constraints on, implementation. In section two, we present the case 
study. In section three we analyze the challenges faced by engineers who supported the floodplain restoration 
project by comparing the literature and the case study.  
1. Identifying the driving forces behind, and constraints on implementation of floodplain restoration 
projects 
In this section we present the scientific literature dealing with the implementation of floodplain restoration 
projects. We analyzed this literature in order to identify the main driving forces behind the implementation of 
such projects, and their constraints.  
In selecting the literature, we considered floodplain restoration in its broad sense. However, we limited our 
selection to scientific articles and book chapters dealing with the implementation of floodplain projects in 
Europe and written in French or in English. We chose articles that tackled social and political aspects of project 
implementation (i.e. we did not focus on technical aspects). We selected documents using the snowballing 
method starting with core articles and using the list of references to identify others. We stopped our search when 
the information we were finding in the articles appeared to be covered by those we had already read. We finally 
selected 14 articles. The small number of articles is due to our strict selection criteria. 
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The literature analysis revealed five categories of driving forces behind, and constraints on the implementation 
of floodplain restoration projects: institutions, participation, science and policy, socio-physical features, and 
economics. The results of this analysis are summarized in table 1.  
2. Floodplain restoration, from Europe to the Rhône  
The River Rhône has been considerably modified throughout history. After major floods in 1856 the Emperor 
Napoleon III constructed large dikes along the delta (Picon et al. 2006). More recently, after World War II, the 
government undertook an extensive river taming project with the aim of promoting river transport and generating 
hydraulic power (Pritchard 2004). The public National Rhône Company CNR (Compagnie Nationale du Rhône), 
partly privatized in 2001, was dedicated to the development of the River Rhône. It received specific missions of 
public interest: developing navigation, hydroelectric power and irrigation systems in the Rhône river basin 
(Giandou 1999). The CNR undertook major works on the river and constructed several dams and levees 
(Pritchard 2011). Later nuclear power plants were built on the banks of the newly channeled river. These works 
deeply changed the river landscape, and influenced its hydraulic regime (Pritchard 2011), but the inhabitants 
only noticed many years after the works were completed.  
Between the 1950s and the 1990s, no major flood event occurred on the Rhône (Picon et al. 2006). Based on 
these forty years, one could have concluded that the CNR works had a beneficial impact in terms of flood 
protection. However, following the first major flood event in 1993, floods found their way back onto the political 
agenda. In fact, CNR infrastructures, including levees, were not intended to protect riverbank inhabitants from 
floods but to channel the river for hydropower and navigation purposes. Where hydropower plants were built, 
houses located behind the levees were protected de facto against 1000-year flood events. But other houses, 
located in areas that were not concerned by hydroelectric power, were subject to intense flooding events. 
Since the 1990s, several dramatic floods have occurred on the Rhône: in 1993, 1994, 2002, and 2003. Hundreds 
of houses were impacted by the Rhône and its tributaries and sometimes even lives were lost. This troubled 
period obliged the State to take measures. In 2003, a major study on the Rhône floods was released in an attempt 
to understand the river basin system and make proposals for policies (Territoire Rhône 2003). In 2004, the Prime 
Minister asked the Prefect (the State’s representative in the Rhône-Alpes Region whose responsibility covers the 
whole Rhone river basin) to design a new flood management strategy for the River Rhône. In collaboration with 
the Prefect, State representatives, and the elected presidents of the administrative Regions, a contract called 
“Plan Rhône” was drawn up. This contract, which concerns the period 2007 to 2013, financially linked the 
French State, the European Union, the CNR and the main towns concerned as well as the Regions bordering the 
Rhône in order to address flood issues at the level of the river basin. This contract entailed a multilevel and 
multi-sector policy on the scale of the River Rhône. Indeed, Plan Rhône combined policies concerned with flood 
management but also with tourism, culture, energy, water quality and transport. 
One of the main aims of Plan Rhône was to produce a new strategy for flood management. Part of this plan, 
namely the flood theme, was piloted by a team called “Mission Rhône” comprised of State engineers. Mission 
Rhône is part of the Ministry of the Environment’s decentralized regional services (called the Regional Direction 
of the Environment, Planning and Housing or DREAL). Between 2005 and 2013, Mission Rhône engineers 
proposed and started to implement a flood management strategy. To that end, Mission Rhône separated the river 
into three geographical entities: Upper Rhône, Middle Rhône and Lower Rhône (Figure 1). For each sector, 
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public consultations took place and a local strategy was created. Here we focus on the strategy designed for the 
Lower Rhône, that included floodplain restoration projects. 
 
Figure 1: Map of Plan Rhône territory. It represents the River Rhône, the administrative Regions surrounding 
the River (Plan Rhône partners), the sub-basin areas (Upper, Middle and Lower Rhône) as well as the area 
concerned with the floodplain restoration project. 
 
The strategy proposed by Mission Rhône for the Lower Rhône followed a particular rationale. It aimed to 
address the risk of dike failure (which had happened in the Rhône delta in 1993, 1994 and 2003) by modifying 
the distribution of risk they considered unequal. Some plains were frequently flooded whereas others were 
protected behind CNR dikes. What is more, several towns of high economic and demographic importance 
located downstream were deemed overly vulnerable, and under too much water pressure in the event of flooding.  
The strategy consisted of several actions aimed at “controlling the overflow”(DREAL Rhône Alpes 2009; 
Territoire Rhône 2003) in the case of flooding through a Floodplains Optimization program. This program was 
planning on one hand, to improve flood protection of certain rural floodplains subject to frequent flooding (on 
average once every ten years, highlighted in blue in Figure 1), and on the other hand, to increase the water 
storage capacity in two floodplains by lowering existing flood-defense infrastructure (highlighted in red in 
Figure 1). The larger is a 1,300 ha plain located behind a major CNR dike and therefore protected against Rhône 
floods up to 1,000 year return period. Land use is agricultural plus residential areas (40 farms and homesteads as 
well as residential houses) (BRL Ingénierie 2008). This project also provided for the reinforcement of dikes 
around the Rhone river delta and around major towns. This program was justified by the need to improve 
solidarity among the sections of the river, between upstream and downstream inhabitants, as well as between the 
two banks (DREAL Rhône Alpes 2009).  
The floodplain restoration project met with the disapproval of local representatives. In 2012, after seven years of 
public consultation, negotiation, and production of experts’ reports, the floodplain restoration project was 
abandoned. Was this failure due to local resistance or to other constraints? In the next section we compare the 
driving forces cited in the literature and failures of project implementation with our case study.  
 
3. Constraints on the implementation of the floodplain restoration project on the Rhône 
Institutions 
The floodplain restoration project was led by a young institution (Plan Rhône) that lacked power and legitimacy. 
Plan Rhône was created in 2007 to design a new flood management strategy. It brought together actors who 
previously had conflicting relationships and opposing interests, in particular the Regions, the State, and the CNR 
(Bethemont 1997). The team supporting the project, Mission Rhône, had no power to decide whether to raise or 
to lower a dike (since this is subject to State regulation and concerned the CNR). Therefore it was obliged to 
negotiate with the CNR and local authorities. The CNR and Mission Rhône had conflicting priorities: electricity 
production versus flood management. Mission Rhône had limited power to negotiate with the local inhabitants 
since neither urban planning nor property rights issues fell within its authority. Moreover, it was not responsible 
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for project implementation nor could it pay financial compensation to the local stakeholders. Mission Rhône 
could only encourage local authorities to implement the project and negotiate compensation between territories 
at the local level.  
This absence of leadership was combined with little support from local stakeholders, local authorities, the central 
State and the CNR. In particular, the representatives of the two local municipalities of the floodplain supposed to 
be restored were concerned with the project’s impact on economic development of the area. The two mayors 
raised concerns about the impact of floods on farms and houses. They firmly opposed the project’s 
implementation. Although they belonged to opposing political parties (right-wing and left-wing), they joined 
forces to oppose the project. This union was illustrated by newspaper articles entitled “The Rhône battle” or “A 
mayoral coalition against Plan Rhône”, picturing the two mayors standing side by side next to the river 
(Dauphiné Libéré, June 12, 2008). In addition, together they hired the services of a hydrologist and an urban-
planner to produce a counter evaluation.  
As well as meeting opposition from the local municipalities, the project also raised concerns among inhabitants 
and elected representatives of other floodplains. Associations, inhabitants and representatives expressed their 
fears concerning the consequences of future Rhône floods at public meetings. The Lower Rhône flood 
management strategy revealed that the flood-prone character of rural floodplains was beneficial for urban areas. 
As a result, inhabitants raised concerns about insurance cover, arguing that flooding triggered by human 
activities might not be covered by insurance policies, since it was not comparable to a natural flood. Inhabitants 
of several floodplains along the Lower Rhone felt concerned by the situation of the floodplain intended for 
restoration. They grouped together, along with flood victim associations, to claim for the recognition of a special 
status for inhabitants living in areas allowing for flood expansion. This claim was later endorsed by elected 
representatives at the regional and departmental levels. In 2005 and in 2010 a group of deputies presented two 
legislative proposals before the French National Assembly to grant particular benefits to inhabitants in “flood 
expansion” areas, in particular through tax exemption (Law proposal N° 2739 (2005) and Law proposal N° 2596 
(2010): « visant à accorder un statut particulier aux communes et aux administrés situés dans les champs 
d’expansion de crues »). 
However, these claims were refused by the Ministry of the Environment. A letter from the Ministry to a Deputy 
(April 24, 2007) stated that the Rhône River floodplains called “ZECs” were “naturally” flood prone, and as 
such, were not eligible for compensation since the dikes did not worsen their flood character in comparison to a 
natural situation. In 2010, a meeting was organized between elected representatives from the Lower Rhône and 
the Office director of the Ministry of the Environment in which the latter declared that granting a particular 
status to all the ZECs would be excessive since, in general, floodplains were naturally flood prone (from the 
minutes of this meeting, June 17, 2010). Granting a particular status to the inhabitants of restored floodplains 
could have facilitated local acceptance of the floodplain restoration project, as a local newspaper pointed out: 
“Rhône. Flooding, okay, but only with a particular status” (Midi Libre, June 19, 2010). 
In addition, only limited support for the project came from the water institution, the CNR. Restoring the 
floodplain meant modifying a CNR dike by lowering it. Since the flood events in the 1990s, the CNR had been 
constantly accused by flood victims’ associations and inhabitants of being responsible for the floods. Even 
though such responsibility has never been acknowledged by experts (Picon et al. 2006), the CNR position 
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regarding flood management was not proactive, but rather defensive. Since flood management is not part of its 
mandate, the company was not particularly willing to modify its dikes not only for financial reasons but also 
because of the political stakes involved.  
In addition, little support came from the central government. As part of the Ministry of the Environment regional 
office, Mission Rhone depends on decisions made by the central government. In 2009, the Ministry expressed 
doubts about the feasibility of the project, in particular from the result of an expert evaluation made by Central 
State engineers criticizing the feasibility of the floodplain restoration project (Creuchet et al. 2009). Mission 
Rhône conducted many feasibility studies for the floodplain restoration project but had no power of decision 
regarding its implementation. Even if Mission Rhône was in favor of its implementation, as civil servants and 
State administrators, they did not have the right to implement the project as commissioners. Local authorities (an 
association of towns, or Departments) could have been commissioners but they did not wish to take 
responsibility for the project. Just before the decision to abandon the project was made public (in 2012), the last 
chance the project had of being implemented depended on the drawing up of a new law enabling the State either 
to take responsibility for the project or to oblige actors such as the CNR to take over project implementation. The 
Ministry did not choose this regulatory path and the project was officially abandoned in 2012 (a letter from the 
Prefect, dated 17th April 2012, announced the decision by the Plan Rhône partners to abandon the floodplain 
restoration project).  
Plan Rhône was defined at the level of the river but was led by the State. In the discourses of local 
representatives as well as inhabitants, the State did not have the legitimacy to organize implementation of a 
floodplain restoration project. Moreover Plan Rhône and Mission Rhône were young institutions with no proven 
record of expertise. However the case of the Rhône is particular in the sense that a major part of the river is 
managed by the CNR, as the company is in charge of hydropower production but also deals with channels and 
dikes. The CNR had an interest in following a path of dependency. No formal association at the level of the river 
links local authorities or municipalities together (Pigeon 2012). This kind of association could have enabled a 
real decentralized flood policy at the level of the river and overcome local opposition. Such an institution existed 
on the River Rhone but was never recognized officially by the State. The State did not leave room for truly 
decentralized flood management.  
Participation 
On the Rhône, the participation of local representatives and inhabitants was organized through consultation 
committees. However, the extent of participation was limited. This participatory approach was introduced quite 
early in the process, but the idea of restoring a floodplain came from an expert evaluation that was commissioned 
by the State before the participation committees started (Territoire Rhône 2003). Sites had already been selected 
when local representatives learned about the project. The committees were organized by the institution in charge 
of the project implementation: Mission Rhône itself. In the participation committees, experts and representatives 
who supported the project presented their ideas to the public who generally raised concerns. Experts gave usually 
technical answers aimed at convincing the public of the project’s advantages. But views and values regarding the 
project were also conflicting. Inhabitants and local representatives denounced power and territorial inequities 
(urban and downstream interests over rural upstream interests), and the responsibility of the State and the CNR 
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regarding the last floods. But this kind of participation was not considered to be constructive or legitimate by 
Mission Rhône. 
The organizers were not obliged to take public participation into account since the assembly had no decision-
making power. Moreover since ‘the public’ represented a broad, heterogeneous audience, it was difficult to 
consider that it carried a clear message and unified interests. In practice, inputs from the public did not help build 
the project design. 
What is more, the two mayors concerned by the floodplain restoration project proposed an alternative project, 
which consisted of creating several water storage tanks in many plains along the Lower Rhône, in order to 
distribute the burden of water storage among more municipalities. The idea was to turn the calamity polders, 
which were considered to be ‘passive’, into ‘active’ polders. However, according to Mission Rhône engineers, 
this project was not feasible since it would not deliver sufficient storage capacity.  
A real communication strategy was developed by Mission Rhône. A full-time post in Mission Rhône is dedicated 
to communication. Before each public committee meeting, invitations and summaries of previous meetings were 
sent to the participants. Workshops and conferences were organized by Plan Rhône about several of their 
projects. However regarding the negotiations about the floodplain restoration project, nothing really constructive 
was achieved. Mission Rhône engineers did not have enough power to respond to the stakeholders’ demands. In 
addition, they tried to educate the inhabitants and political representatives rather than to construct a shared view 
of the project. They did not incorporate public inputs in the project; they were not powerful enough to negotiate 
with the local representatives, and their decision-making process was not sufficiently transparent.  
Science and Policy 
In this project, few links were created between science and policy. Expert evaluation was produced by research 
consultancy and studies were commissioned and coordinated by Mission Rhône. The results were presented in 
consultative meetings but there was a knowledge gap between the experts and the public. No particular social 
science expert evaluation was commissioned in order to include social and political issues in the project design. 
Mission Rhône did regularly consult a “scientific committee”, however this was mainly limited to technical 
issues, and did not grant the committee decision support. 
Scientific uncertainty was high regarding the water storage capacity of the floodplain as well as the potential 
water level in the plain in the case of floods. This uncertainty about the behavior of water flow, along with the 
uncertainty about the impact of the project on downstream water levels, contributed to the prevention of support 
among local stakeholders. 
The reason used to justify the restoration of the floodplain was primarily hydrological. However, detailed 
hydrological studies concluded that this narrative was questionable. Indeed, the rationale of the Lower Rhône 
flood management strategy was constructed on a study that included the whole Rhône (Territoire Rhône 2003). 
In this study, the principle of restoring a floodplain was considered to have potentially positive hydrological 
effects on downstream plains and towns. However, later, more detailed studies revealed that the water storage 
capacity was not as high as planned. A micro-scale study revealed that, due to the slope of the land and the 
existence of an urban neighborhood, the floodplain could store less water than originally envisaged (BRL 
Ingénierie 2008). Indeed, one of the first scenarios planned to achieve a water storage capacity of 67 million 
cubic meters (under 3.75 meters of water) in the case of an ‘generalized exceptional flood’ (greater than the 400-
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year flood) on the whole river and its tributaries (DREAL Rhône Alpes et CNR 2010). This 3.75 meter water 
level was considered to be socially and politically unacceptable by the central State engineers. To reduce the 
impact of the flood, the following scenario reduced water storage capacity to 32 million cubic meters (under 2.2 
meters of water). For this kind of flood, the decrease in the water level downstream would be 10 to 15 
centimeters, whereas with the previous scenario it was 20 to 25 cm (DREAL Rhône Alpes et CNR 2010).  
Although the hydraulic benefits were limited, interviews with the Mission Rhône engineers revealed that the 
floodplain restoration project was advantageous for other reasons. Indeed, the flood management activities of 
Plan Rhône were partially funded by the European Union through the European Regional Development Funds 
(ERDF), which could be used for flood prevention but only under certain conditions: to implement measures 
consistent with the approach of the European Directive, i.e. environment-friendly measures and not dike 
heightening. Moreover, an existing water planning document on the Rhône prevented the construction of dikes 
when no hydraulic compensation was planned to store the extra water (SDAGE 2010-2015). As such, the 
floodplain restoration project was a necessary condition to allow the heightening of dikes on the River Rhône. 
Socio-physical features 
Another problem with project implementation was defining a natural flood. Restoring the flood-prone character 
of a plain implies referring to a time when the plain used to be flood prone. In the Lower Rhône flood 
management strategy, the reference used for floodplains to be restored is the ‘ZEC”. Plan Rhône participated in 
the publication of a book in which the ZEC concept is defined thus: 
“A ZEC (…) is a floodplain subjected to natural floods. This expression is used to designate 
‘areas with little or no urbanization and development, where a flood can store a large amount 
of water, such as natural areas, farmlands, urban and peripheral green areas, sports fields, 
car parks” (Bravard, J.-P. and A. Clémens, Eds. (2008). Le Rhône en 100 Questions
Behind this acronym are entangled ideas about the naturalness of a risk as well as the utility of a flood, expressed 
by the idea that a ZEC is supposed to be undeveloped and is useful to store water in the case of flood.  
. Lyon, 
GRAIE). 
Several rural areas were identified as ZECs on the Lower Rhône by the hydrological study (Territoire Rhône 
2003). This study reported that the CNR constructed 150 km of dikes on the Rhône banks (or 35% of its course), 
transforming 120 km² of floodplains into flood protected areas, which represented 18% of the land that was 
impacted by the 1856 flood. The study underlined the artificial nature of flooding due to the CNR hydraulic 
infrastructure, and distinguished between the current flood-prone areas, called “natural flood expansion fields” 
and the former floodplains now protected by CNR dikes. However, under the Lower Rhône river flood 
management strategy, even the former floodplains were labeled ZECs. 
Designating former floodplains as ZECs actually refers to natural flooding. However, the Rhône hydrological 
regime was modified by CNR works. The term ZEC today designates plains that are considered to be flood 
prone based on the modeling of a past event in a currently urbanized context. This fuzzy definition of a ZEC led 
to discontent among the inhabitants of those areas. Some inhabitants realized that their area’s flood-prone 
character was useful to downstream towns, and consequently claimed compensation or at least the recognition of 
a particular status. Others (who lived in the floodplain that was supposed to be restored) discovered that after 
fifty years of being protected they might again become flood prone. Given the urban development that has 
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occurred in the last fifty years in rural areas, as well as changes in agricultural practices, restoring flooding in the 
territory led to a considerable degree of local discontent. 
Economics 
The floodplain restoration project was not a “low-cost project”. The cost of the works to allow the restoration of 
the floodplain was estimated at 10.4 million Euros, not including the cost of the downstream floodplains whose 
protection was supposed to be enhanced. In total, the cost of the project was estimated at 54 million Euros (Egeo 
Solutions and Ledoux 2011).  
Locally, no economic incentive was available to local stakeholders. No direct financial compensation was 
proposed to the inhabitants of the plain for the water storage its restoration would allow. This was because of the 
idea that the Rhône floodplain is naturally flood prone. Indeed, the law does not permit the payment of 
compensation to inhabitants for reducing flood protection but only for an increase in flood risk. Since Rhône 
floodplains were considered naturally flood prone, the floodplain restoration project was still improving the 
situation in comparison with a no-dike situation. As such, State officials were not allowed to pay compensation. 
Such financial incentives could have been funded by downstream plains that were supposed to benefit from the 
project. However, the downstream plains did not consider the potential benefit high enough to take responsibility 
for implementing the project and organizing compensation locally. This is also explained by the scientific 
uncertainties surrounding the project findings that were expressed in public meetings. Mission Rhône had no 
power to suggest purchasing the land belonging to farmers and inhabitants or to pay them direct financial 
compensation. Farmers were consequently not economically motivated to accept a project that as far as they 
were concerned, above all represented constraints. Mission Rhône was proposing to let the flood enter a plain 
where land was particularly good for growing crops, where houses were built and where life had developed 
behind large dykes for 40 years, with no financial compensation in return. Farmers -more than anyone else- 
recall the times when the plain used to be flood prone. They believe that farming techniques and life style have 
changed too much for agriculture to be adapted to flooding. 
Conclusion 
Restoring a floodplain of a modified and channeled river such as the Rhône proved to be a challenge. The project 
we analyzed came up against a number of difficulties and was finally abandoned. To understand the reasons for 
this failure, the indicators identified in the literature proved to be particularly accurate. However, some could be 
added to the list. The literature recognizes that above all institutional factors explain the failure or success of 
floodplain restoration projects. On the Rhône, the leading institution in charge of the project implementation was 
created at the river-basin level, supposed to be the right scale to tackle ‘wicked problems’ such as flood risk 
(Varone et al. 2013). However, this institution was not legitimate and sufficiently powerful support the project. 
Moreover, it impeded local elected representatives from organizing and taking over the implementation process. 
The lack of legislative flexibility impeded negotiation with the inhabitants who claimed their special status 
should be recognized. The artificial character of a flood provoked by a floodplain restoration project created 
insecurity among the inhabitants who feared losing insurance cover. Regarding participation, the project did not 
empower local actors sufficiently to reinforce the legitimacy of the leading institution and to enable local 
support. The fact that the participative committees were organized by the institution in charge of the project 
implementation was not adequate. As regards science and policy indicators, the project suffered from hydraulic 
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uncertainty that provoked concerns among the local actors, largely because the interactions between state 
engineers and local actors were mainly technical. Other institutional reasons lay behind the reasons for restoring 
the floodplain, but hidden by hydraulic narratives that suffered from scientific uncertainty. The proponents of the 
floodplain restoration project committed to its implementation before carrying out detailed studies. We did not 
observe opposing representations regarding restoration between local actors and Mission Rhône engineers, but 
rather, opposing representations about the objectives to be pursued: the engineers gave greater importance to 
flood-risk sharing whereas local actors gave greater importance to keeping their flood security standards. 
Another difference of standpoint concerned local actors’ view of the correct reference to use when considering 
the flood-prone character of a plain: proponents of the project, along with the central administration, considered 
the time when the plain was not protected by dikes, whereas the local actors took as a reference the ‘protected’ 
situation. No social science study had been carried out at the design stage of the project to identify those 
differences of standpoint. Physical and sociological features identified in the literature did not play a large role in 
the project failure, except the fact that the floodplain intended for restoration had in the past benefited from a 
high flood defense strategy that proved, indeed, difficult to challenge. Regarding the economic indicators, what 
played a role in the failure of the project was the absence of compensation funds granted to the local actors. This 
is linked to what the law considers to be a natural flood, and is another illustration of opposing terms of 
reference between project proponents and local actors. Maybe those conflicting representations could have been 
identified, and tackled, through a sociological study.  
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Table 1: Potential constraints on and driving forces behind implementation of floodplain 
restoration projects according to the literature 
 
 
Potential driving forces for implementation Potential constraints on implementation 
Institutional 
Strong, legitimate, large, well-funded lead organization, 
with clear remits and proven ability to work with other 
stakeholders and with charismatic individuals (Adams et 
al. 2005) 
Small or young lead organization with lack of secure core 
funding, no proven track record in project management or 
substantial planning capacity, weak leadership (Adams et al. 
2005) 
Institutional structure appropriate for the multiple 
objectives of floodplain restoration (Hodge and McNally 
2000), concerning not only water but also property right 
issues (Roth and Winnubst 2009)  
Small number of partners (Adams et al. 2005) 
Issues of coordination between sector-based public agencies 
and between administrative levels ; conflicting priorities 
between partners (Turner et al. 2000; Adams et al. 2005; 
Moss and Monstadt 2008; Adams and Perrow 1999);  
Support from and/or partnership with NGOs and local 
associations (Adams et al. 2005; Pedroli et al. 2002) 
Design not led by grassroots local needs (Adams et al. 2005) 
Local communities value the environment (Adams et al. 
2005) 
 
Water institutions that participate in the implementation 
are friendly to environmental issues (Hodge and McNally 
2000) 
Local communities value flood defense goals over 
environmental concerns (Adams et al. 2005; Moss and 
Monstadt 2008; van der Werff 2004). 
Restoration interests opposed to flood defense goals of 
planning organizations ; inertia of the traditional flood 
defense and river regulation regimes (Adams et al. 2005; 
Moss and Monstadt 2008) 
Policy and planning controls unable to limit urbanization of 
floodplains (Moss and Monstadt 2008) 
Participation 
Participation organized at an early stage of the 
implementation process (Eden and Tunstall 2006), active 
(Maltby 1991), including all stakeholders (Morris 2005), 
enabling open discussion of a range of views and values 
(Warner 2010).  
Implementation models that develop a ‘deficit model’ of 
public understanding (i.e. technocratic environmental 
management, top-down approaches, expertise monopolized 
by the scientific community and policymakers) are more 
likely to fail (Eden and Tunstall 2006; Roth and Warner 
2007; Adams et al. 2005; Roth and Winnubst 2009)  
Identification of local people's aspirations and priorities for 
a river site and incorporate them in the design of the 
project (Eden and Tunstall 2006) 
Consider alternatives to the project proposed by local 
actors (Warner 2010) 
Mismatch between the expectations of restoration and policy 
workers and those of their local publics (Eden and Tunstall 
2006) 
Concerned population learns about the project plans when 
the sites have already been selected (Roth and Warner 2007) 
No link between participation and decision-making (Warner 
2010) 
Negotiation skills of river managers (Adams et al. 2005; 
Roth and Warner 2007; Maltby 1991). 
Education programs, management training within water 
management institutions (Maltby 1991) 
Identify the needs and aspirations of local inhabitants and 
link the restoration project to their interests, in particular 
regarding flood risk concerns (Adams et al. 2005; Nedelcu 
et al. 2007; Eden and Tunstall 2006). 
 
Top-down management style (Roth and Winnubst 2009) 
Landowners’ concerns with flood safety and flood risk 
(Eden and Tunstall 2006) 
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Science and Policy 
Incorporating social science at the design stage of the 
project (Eden and Tunstall 2006; Brouwer and van Ek 
2004; Turner et al. 2000) 
Failing to consider the sociopolitical issues at play can 
exacerbate conflicts (Eden and Tunstall 2006).  
 
Making complex issues comprehensible to stakeholders 
(Adams et al. 2005) 
Shared vision of flood storage objectives (Moss and 
Monstadt 2008) 
Scientific uncertainties, e.g. behavior of flood waters 
(Adams and Perrow 1999; Turner et al. 2000).  
Opposing representations of restoration that can lead to 
misunderstandings and conflicting interests (Eden and 
Tunstall 2006; Adams and Perrow 1999; Morris 2005).  
Socio-physical features 
Small sites and limited number of stakeholders (Adams et 
al. 2005; Roth and Winnubst 2009) ; Flexibility of 
property rights (Roth and Winnubst 2009) 
Fragmented holdings ; large-scale projects (Adams et al. 
2005) 
Relatively stable lowland rivers (Adams et al. 2005) Bank erosion and unplanned hydraulic effects (Adams et al. 
2005) ; High uncertainties about effects of restoration (Eden 
and Tunstall 2006) 
Land already managed for wildlife (Adams et al. 2005) River that was previously the subject of flood defense 
strategy (Adams et al. 2005; Moss and Monstadt 2008) 
Economics 
‘Low-cost’ projects (Adams et al. 2005; Pedroli et al. 
2002) 
Funds available to support restoration (Adams et al. 2005), 
targeting landholders (Hodge and McNally 2000) 
No funding dedicated to restoration (Eden and Tunstall 
2006) 
Land where the profitability of agriculture or soil quality is 
already declining (Adams et al. 2005) 
High economic value, arable or built-up land (Roth and 
Winnubst 2009; Moss and Monstadt 2008; Adams et al. 
2005). 
Flexible and negotiable compensation or agreements 
offered to farmers, fitting a maximum of individual 
situations (Hodge and McNally 2000; Roth and Winnubst 
2009; Pedroli et al. 2002).  
Adverse economic incentives for farmers and landowners to 
land use change (Moss and Monstadt 2008) 
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